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Chapter 6
Emerging Threats and 
Vulnerabilities
Reality and Rhetoric
Curiosity is lying in wait for every secret.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
One day, it’s hard to read an online news source, pick up a newspaper, or watch TV 
without seeing reports of new threats: cybercrimes, data breaches, industrial espionage, 
and potential destruction of national infrastructure. These reports inevitably leave the 
impression that we are drowning in an inexorable tide of new and terrifying threats.
One has to question how much of this is rhetoric, and how much is reality. There are 
political and profit-driven motives for making threats seem bigger and more imminent 
than they really are. US government officials have warned that cyber attacks potentially 
can be “devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects” 
(Levin 2010). Such warnings have been used to justify requests for increased national 
cybersecurity funding, as well as proposed restrictions on private networks. It’s not 
surprising, therefore, that some experts have expressed skepticism about the real extent 
of the threat. In fact, academics at the George Mason University Mercatus Center have 
warned, “the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that 
seen in the run-up to the Iraq War” (Brito and Watkins 2012).
On the other hand, common sense tells us new cyber threats really are emerging and 
growing. Malware production has matured into a sizable industry. More data is online 
and vulnerable to attack, and millions of new Internet-connected devices are inevitably 
introducing new risks.
Given the flood of often-conflicting information, how can we get an accurate picture 
of the threat landscape so that we can develop an appropriate security strategy? How do 
we determine which threats directly affect our organizations, and distinguish them from 
those that are irrelevant? How do we decide which threats require immediate defensive 
measures, as opposed to those that attract attention but don’t yet present significant risks?
In this chapter, I’ll describe methods for identifying the real threat and vulnerability 
trends among the rhetoric. I’ll also discuss some key areas of threat activity that have been 
analyzed using these methods. My goal is to help information security groups stay ahead 
of the attackers and focus their limited resources on mitigating the most important threats.
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Structured Methods for Identifying Threat Trends
To identify the real trends in emerging threats among the mass of news and speculation, 
we need to carefully examine the available information using a structured, analytical 
approach. Unfortunately, many security groups absorb information about emerging 
threats using methods that are unstructured and sometimes almost haphazard.
A typical process looks something like this. The security team relies on external 
sources, such as news feeds and alerts, as well as informal anecdotes, to gather 
information about emerging threats. Based on this information, the team holds 
brainstorming sessions to review the threat landscape. The output from these sessions is 
a list of “top risks.” Security resources are then focused on mitigating the items on the list.
There are several problems with this approach. Information comes from a narrow, 
limited range of sources, resulting in a blinkered security perspective that tends to stifle 
creative thinking. Also, the information is usually fragmented, making it difficult for the 
team to identify trends and gaps in the data. These deficiencies continue through security 
planning and implementation. Because the team lacks a full view of the threat landscape, 
it’s hard to determine which threats require immediate attention and how much of the 
limited security budget they deserve. As a result, risks are incorporated into plans on an 
ad hoc basis, and not all risks are adequately mitigated. Finally, security teams often don’t 
have a structured process for communicating threat information to other people within 
their organizations. Because of this, people outside the security group remain unaware of 
emerging risks and don’t know how to respond when they experience an attack.
At Intel, we realized the limitations of this approach several years ago and began trying 
to inject more rigor into our risk-sensing strategy. Over time, we’ve progressively developed 
a more structured risk-sensing process that helps us identify threats, prioritize them, plan 
our response, and deliver actionable information to other groups across the company. 
Through continued use, risk sensing has become a systemic process within Intel.
Our process for analyzing emerging threats includes several valuable techniques 
that may be unfamiliar to security groups at most other organizations. We use a product 
life cycle analogy to track threats as they mature from theoretical risks into full-blown 
exploits. We also use nontraditional analysis techniques, such as war games and threat 
agent profiles, to encourage creative thinking and identify threats we might otherwise 
miss. I’ll discuss these methods in more detail later in this chapter.
The process is managed by a small core team, supplemented by a broad set of experts 
across Intel. This arrangement ensures continuity while enabling the team to mine a 
diverse variety of sources to get a more complete picture of immediate and future threats.
Security team members research a wide range of individual security topics in 
depth. Besides using typical sources, such as external feeds and analysis, they mine 
academic research and hacker discussion forums, and they network with other security 
professionals. Other team members scan the regulatory horizon to identify upcoming 
laws and regulations that may impact us. We also analyze internal investigations and 
other near-miss incident data. Team members communicate with each other frequently 
to identify areas of potential overlap.
We then hold regular meetings to analyze the threat landscape. Each security 
domain expert explains their findings to other members of Intel’s security community. 
For each security topic, we review recent events and then look ahead to the future. 
Reflecting on what has happened helps us identify the key trends and the factors driving 
those trends, and it provides context that we use to analyze the current state. We then look 
ahead to predict the likely evolution of each threat based on the trends we’ve identified. 
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This structured evaluation uncovers emerging risks we wouldn’t otherwise see. We also 
look back at our previous predictions to see which ones were accurate, and to analyze the 
reasons why threats may not have materialized in the way we expected.
We communicate our findings to stakeholders across Intel in regular reports and 
briefings, including a wide-ranging annual assessment of the threat landscape. This 
communication provides further opportunities to get feedback from across Intel’s 
business, which we can use to refine our risk-sensing analysis.
The Product Life Cycle Model
We have found that a product life cycle model is a useful way to track and prioritize 
emerging threats as they evolve and begin to present real risks to the enterprise. Like all 
security groups, we have a limited budget, and we need to direct our resources to mitigate 
the highest-priority threats.
This model, shown in Figure 6-1, recognizes that many threats initially emerge as 
theoretical risks, but are on a path to exploitation, and we need to evaluate and monitor them.
Research
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being researched and
discussed, but have not been
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Threat publicity demonstrated or otherwise
validated, without release of full details and code
Proof of Concept (PoC) code becomes publicly available
Exploits are detected
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Figure 6-1. The product life cycle model for tracking the evolution of threats. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012
Often, researchers or hackers first reveal a possible attack or vulnerability at 
a security conference or publish information about it online. Next, attackers begin 
testing the use of this technique and making this information publicly available. Once 
the method has been proven, the threat enters the production phase as attackers start 
exploiting it in earnest. Ultimately, the threat becomes a mature commodity—source 
code is often freely available, many variants exist, and organizations treat the threat as 
part of the everyday landscape and build defenses accordingly.
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This life cycle model enables us to systematically track the evolution of threats. 
It helps us determine when we need to allocate resources to fighting each threat. As 
each threat approaches maturity, we can examine how it is likely to affect us and plan 
appropriate mitigation.
In addition, at a product manufacturing company like Intel, this model provides a 
great way to communicate actionable information to business groups using terminology 
they understand—the product life cycle. When we provide our regular threat landscape 
assessments to stakeholders, each security topic includes a description of activity at 
each life cycle phase, thus providing a context that helps business groups across Intel 
determine how they should act on each of these emerging risks.
Let’s examine some examples showing how we use this model in real life. Figure 6-2 
illustrates the evolution of threats targeting smartphones and other handheld devices. 
Researchers and hackers began to take notice of handheld devices almost a decade 
ago, demonstrating weaknesses and theoretical avenues of exploitation. Initially, they 
focused on what were then known as personal digital assistants. As smartphones took 
off, attackers shifted their attention to this bigger market, which rapidly became a major 
area of threat activity. Monitoring this trend enabled us to prepare internally and inform 
Intel product development groups. As the threats matured and employees began using 
smartphones more widely at work, we then developed risk mitigation measures including 
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Figure 6-2. How Intel used the product life cycle model to track and respond to 
smartphone security threats. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012
Chapter 6 ■ emerging threats and Vulnerabilities
75
By visually comparing activity across multiple threat areas, we can quickly identify 
major areas of activity and see the likely timing and extent of their impact. This chart 
shows the areas experiencing the most exploits today. It also shows us areas in which 
there are numerous proof-of-concept tests and other activities that suggest major 
problems in the near future. And it indicates areas of focused research that may ripen 
into active exploitation over the long term. Figure 6-3 shows how the activity in the 
areas of social computing and smartphones has shifted heavily to active exploitation, as 
previously predicted. It also shows an increase in research into threats to applications, 
which is likely to metamorphose into full-blown attacks in the future.
Figure 6-3. A visual comparison of security-related activity across different technology 
areas. Data are for illustration purposes only. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012
Though the depth of detail in Figure 6-3 is valuable to our security team, we have 
found a simpler, consolidated view can help communicate the essential trends to a 
broader audience. We have recently begun supplementing our threat analysis materials 
with charts like the one shown in Figure 6-4. These are based on the activity identified 
using the product life cycle model, but we add further trend analysis and group the 
activity areas into four main clusters, depending on their level of activity and maturity 
potential and on their potential impact to the company.



































Figure 6-4. Clustering areas of threat activity to highlight trends. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012
These clusters are:
•	 Sustained Drivers. These are areas that already have a high 
impact or otherwise cause considerable concern. Typically, 
they are characterized by commoditized distribution and active 
exploitation by multiple threat agents. Today, examples include 
malware and web attacks.
•	 Critical Trends. These areas have begun undergoing active 
exploitation, with growing adoption beginning to shift toward 
commoditization. Current examples include social computing 
and smartphones.
•	 Emerging Trends. These areas have a low current level of 
exploitation, but considerable research and proof-of-concept 
activity. Examples include embedded and cloud computing.
•	 Disruptive Trends. These are areas with little or no active 
exploitation, but significant research activity and the disruptive 
potential to cause a major security problem. Frequently, they are 
discussed as theoretical risks, and because of this, many people 
in the industry would be caught off guard by a significant event. 
Examples include virtualization, an area in which potential 
threats and vulnerabilities have been exposed and a successful 
exploit could cause far-reaching damage.
We have found that clustering threat analysis information in this way enhances 
communication with stakeholders across Intel. Representing the information in  
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easy-to-understand charts helps to convey the key trends and their potential impact to 
a broad cross-section of people, helping them quickly assess whether they need to make 
adjustments to security strategy.
Understanding Threat Agents
Besides the product life cycle analogy, we also apply other techniques that help us think 
creatively about threats and identify risks we might otherwise miss.
Behind every threat is a human agent. To effectively plan our defenses, it helps if we 
can understand why and how these agents operate: their motives, typical methods, and 
targets. However, we realized several years ago that we lacked agreed-upon definitions of 
threat agents, as well as a clear understanding of which agents actually pose the biggest 
risks to us.
Some agents and their activities attract considerable publicity, resulting in the “TV 
news effect:” the most-publicized agents appear to be the biggest threat, so they often 
receive a disproportionately large percentage of limited mitigation resources. In reality, 
a wide spectrum of threat agents exists, some of which may be less well-known but pose 
bigger threats. For example, hactivists often want to publicize their activities as much as 
possible to draw attention to their cause. This publicity makes them appear to be a bigger 
threat than other groups, such as organized crime syndicates, which try to conceal their 
exploits.
In addition, terms often are used without clear agreement about what they mean. 
The phrase advanced persistent threat has become a buzzword whose exact meaning 
depends on who is using the term. It usually implies adaptive, long-term strategies 
employing a variety of stealthy techniques and used by attackers with considerable 
resources. However, it’s important to remember that a variety of agents may be capable 
of generating this type of threat. To understand and predict their likely motives and 
methods, it would be more useful to clearly define the agents, whether they represent 
nations or other powerful groups, such as organized crime.
To solve these problems, we developed a standard threat agent library that provides 
a consistent, up-to-date reference describing the human agents that pose threats to our 
information assets (Casey 2007). The library helps risk management professionals quickly 
identify relevant threat agents and understand the importance of the threats.
The library acts as a collection point for information about each agent, making it 
easier to share information across Intel. It includes profiles of agents such as disgruntled 
employees, opportunistic employees, industrial spies, and politically motivated attackers. 
The library also catalogs agents’ typical targets, objectives, skill levels, current activity, 
and exploit outcomes. As part of our regular threat assessments, we determine which 
agents pose the biggest risks to Intel. We then can use the information about their typical 
methods and exploits to help plan our strategy. The library helps us understand why 
specific events and attack trends occur and what might happen next.
Playing War Games
We conduct war games a few times a year. War games are intense role-playing exercises 
in which Intel employees take on the role of attackers and attempt to compromise key 
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assets using any feasible methods (Casey and Willis 2008). We have found war games are 
particularly valuable for analyzing threats that could have major consequences but whose 
vulnerabilities are not well understood.
This technique provides the most comprehensive method of assessing threats to key 
assets, because the people playing the role of our adversaries are essentially allowed to use 
any method to achieve their goals. However, because of this, it is also resource-intensive 
and should be used selectively.
A typical war game takes one and a half days and might involve eight to ten Intel staff 
from a variety of roles, such as factory workers, business process leads, salespeople, and 
technical experts.
The game focuses on a target or scenario, such as disabling a key facility or stealing 
Intel’s trade secrets. We can use war games to examine potentially catastrophic events 
with a low probability of occurrence, but a high probability of causing damage if they 
do occur. The team members are instructed about the threat agents involved and draw 
on archetypes from Intel’s threat agent library. Led by a facilitator, the team takes on the 
attacker’s perspective and postulates ways to achieve the attack’s objectives.
Because the team can propose any attack method, they often identify risks that 
might be overlooked using conventional methods. For example, a malicious group might 
attempt a devastating attack by purchasing a small but essential technology provider 
and inserting malware into their products in order to infect their customers. After each 
game, security analysts examine the results to determine how to address newly identified 
vulnerabilities.
At Intel, we also examine the cyber consequences of large physical events as part 
of our disaster recovery planning. These could include earthquakes and tsunamis that 
damage data centers, or even solar flares that disrupt the communications that the 
business relies on. Exercises can include drills that last a day or more.
A large company like Intel can justify the considerable effort involved in conducting 
these exercises because of the enormous potential benefit of mitigating the threats.
But smaller companies can also benefit by considering extreme events and 
formulating response plans. If you prepare for the extreme, you’ll be more prepared to 
deal with everyday events. Planning doesn’t need to be as resource-intensive as war 
games. It can be as basic as bringing team members together to discuss likely scenarios 
and responses. This method enables members to get a feel for what it would be like to 
work together should an actual disaster occur. Considering these extremes can also 
provide motivation for introducing simple yet effective measures to reduce the risk 
that catastrophes will occur. You might realize it is worth increasing investment in user 
education to reduce the risk of social engineering compromises, or becoming more 
diligent about analyzing logs and network traffic to identify patterns that indicate  
botnet activity.
Trends That Span the Threat Landscape
I’ve described some of the methods that can be used to analyze emerging threats. Now 
I’d like to turn to some of the key themes we have identified in emerging threat analysis 
conducted by Intel’s information security group. These themes paint a broad-brush 
picture of threat and vulnerability trends spanning multiple technologies across the 
threat landscape.
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Trust Is an Attack Surface
As the technology industry erects new technical defenses, attackers seek to bypass these 
controls by exploiting user trust—typically using social engineering techniques such as 
phishing.
If an attacker can win a user’s trust with a sufficiently convincing e-mail or fake web 
site, the user will make it easy for the attacker by clicking a link or downloading a file. 
These actions usually undermine even the most rigorous system-level controls, initiating 
a chain of compromises that ultimately can result in major damage.
In 2011, this breach of trust was a common theme linking every major reported 
compromise. The initial stages of each of these compromises involved employees who 
trusted an external communication such as a targeted phishing attack.
Whenever users place their trust in a new technology, attackers quickly follow. 
Studies have shown users trust social media services more than other information 
sources—a user is more likely to click a link if it appears to have been sent by a social 
media “friend.” Exploiting this trend, attackers have spread malware via social computing 
circles of trust such as friend networks.
Attackers have also been quick to take advantage of the trust users place in their 
smartphones and in other appliances, such as game consoles. The exploitation of trust 
also extends to the relationships between systems. Once configured, communications 
between systems often operate autonomously, without manual oversight. Smartphones 
are set to automatically update applications from trusted app stores; other systems 
blindly trust firmware updates and dutifully install them. This automation provides 
convenient opportunities to insert malicious code, abusing trust without the need to 
directly involve the user.
In the near future, we anticipate trust will become a commodity that is bought and 
sold. The digital reputation of systems and services will become critically important. In 
the past, tokens of trust, such as digital certificates and social computing credentials, 
were stolen for immediate use. In the future, they will be stolen so they can be sold in 
underground markets. The value of these tokens depends upon the access they grant and 
the other circles of trust they can be used to penetrate. Already, attackers are using stolen 
digital certificates to sign their malware in an attempt to avoid detection by operating 
system defenses.
I expect social engineering attacks will continue to present significant risks because 
they exploit human weaknesses and will adapt to take advantage of new technologies. 
So we, as security professionals, need to focus on the role of users as part of the security 
perimeter, as I discussed in Chapter 5. To reduce the risk to the enterprise, we need to 
make users more security-aware and influence them to act in more secure ways.
Barriers to Entry Are Crumbling
Our adversaries gravitate toward the path of least resistance. They tend to select targets 
that are easy to access and analyze, and they typically use the most readily available and 
cheapest tools.
They are much less likely to use methods with high barriers to entry such as the need 
for specialized expertise, expensive hardware or software, or access to extensive compute 
capacity. However, several of these barriers have begun to crumble as a result of trends 
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such as cloud computing, lower-cost communications components, and commodity 
malware toolsets. This trend ultimately is likely to result in new types of attack.
A key factor is that security researchers are sharing not only their knowledge but also 
the tools they design as part of their research. Recently publicized tools, such as rogue 
base stations and Bluetooth sniffers, provide attackers with more accessible, low-cost 
ways to intercept network traffic. Researchers have uncovered vulnerabilities in femtocell 
devices (miniature, low-cost cell towers) that can be used to take control of the devices, 
lowering the barriers to attacks targeting cell phone data traffic.
Using a laptop and open-source software, a highly skilled researcher demonstrated 
the ability to create a base station to locate and communicate with a smartphone, then 
crash the mobile device and install rootkit or backdoor software on it.
Ultimately, lower barriers to entry mean increased risk to enterprises. However, 
because several of these areas are still at the research stage, it can take time for them to 
mature into active exploitation.
The Rise of Edge Case Insecurity
Each day, the environment becomes more complex with millions of new devices, 
each running its own operating system and collection of applications. This complexity 
generates new edge cases—problems or situations that occur only in unexpected or 
extreme situations.
Edge cases can include unlikely interactions between two familiar objects. A hacker 
team recently demonstrated that, with a popular smartphone, a paperclip (used to pop 
out the phone’s SIM card at the critical moment), and a little patience, it’s possible to 
gain access to contact information, phone call logs and voice mail, e-mails, and other 
information stored on the phone.
Overall, the growing number of third-party plug-ins and widgets introduce edge 
cases that are hard for developers to anticipate even if they use secure design techniques.
Interoperability between programs has resulted in a new category of hybrid attacks 
where malicious objects are concealed in innocent-looking ones to thwart detection. 
One proof of concept in 2011 demonstrated it was possible to conceal a fully functioning 
Trojan in an e-mail plug-in.
Some of these hybrid attacks have shown they can circumvent new security features. 
As web browsers and search engines try to protect users from malicious links, attackers 
are responding by hiding links in image search results, where they cannot be detected 
using standard tools. Research into network intrusion methods has discovered over a 
hundred methods of evading detection by manipulating traffic to remain functional but 
undetectable by typical tools.
There is no silver-bullet solution for eliminating edge-case insecurities. It’s unlikely 
even the most rigorous testing could ever uncover them all. The best approach may be  
to exercise caution when adopting new technologies with the potential to generate  
edge cases.
The Enemy Knows the System
The technology industry has often relied on security through obscurity—the idea that if 
attackers can’t see the insecurities in code or other technology, they won’t exploit them.
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Over time, it has become clear that security through obscurity is poor security. To 
quote the maxim coined by Claude Shannon, one of the founders of modern computing: 
“The enemy knows the system.”
It’s now relatively easy for attackers to get access to the same tools enterprises use, 
such as web hosting services and smartphone application development tools. Hackers 
can now more easily engineer malware and attacks that take advantage of these elements. 
The fact that static platform controls tend to become less effective over time (one of the 
Irrefutable Laws of Information Security noted in Chapter 1) is partly due to the ability of 
malware authors to pretest their malicious code against technical controls.
Even the success of social engineering demonstrates that the attackers’ knowledge 
of the target greatly increases the likelihood of successful deception. Today, competitors 
and other threat agents learn a great deal about a company and its employees by simply 
searching information publicly available on web sites or social media accounts.
Because we cannot assume insecure technology is safe just because it is hidden, we 
need to design with security in mind. The ineffectiveness of security through obscurity is 
also an argument in favor of standards and open-source solutions. This idea may initially 
seem counterintuitive, but the fact that open source is exposed to public scrutiny requires 
it to be secure. At a minimum, we should ensure devices are rigorously tested against 
industry standards because the attackers will do so.
Key Threat Activity Areas
Threats are evolving in many technology areas, from embedded systems to cloud 
computing. I’d like to discuss a few areas experiencing significant developments with 
implications for enterprise IT.
The Industry of Malware
Malware has become a profitable industry that increasingly resembles the legitimate 
software market, with market leaders, mergers, licensing agreements, real-time support, 
and open source. The organized business activity in this market reflects the extent to 
which well-crafted malware has become a viable career pursuit for members of the 
criminal underground.
Today, malware development and malware use may be distinct activities carried out 
by different groups or individuals. Malware authors are producing standardized toolkits, 
which have made life much easier for would-be attackers. These attackers can now 
simply buy or acquire a toolkit rather than expending the effort to identify vulnerable web 
sites and develop their own exploits.
The Zeus malware family provides a useful case study showing how complex this 
industry has become and how hard it is to accurately track developments. Sold mainly 
in underground forums, Zeus has been used extensively for theft by creating botnet 
nodes. During 2011, a code merger was reported between Zeus and another popular 
crimeware kit, complete with assurances of future support for the customers of both 
products. Around the same time, Zeus toolkit source code was made publicly available. 
Since then, multiple new variants have appeared and been used for a variety of attacks. At 
one point, security researchers attempting to monitor Zeus exploits discovered a server 
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they believed was the hub of a Zeus botnet. However, the server was the equivalent of 
an espionage honey pot, allowing the botmasters to turn the tables by spying on the 
researchers who were attempting to analyze the hub.
The Web As an Attack Surface
The Web continues to present a huge attack surface. And this attack surface is growing 
rapidly with the number of connected devices expected to expand to a billion or more. 
These include nontraditional devices such as appliances and control systems, cars, and 
the “smart” grid. Each of these is a potential source of risks.
For a glimpse of the probable future, consider the history of embedded devices in 
the enterprise environment. Companies have a history of deploying specialized devices 
without engineering security controls that reflect the risks these devices can introduce. 
Often, businesses deploy off-the-shelf devices without taking steps to harden them 
because of the perception that specialized devices are “dumb” and do not have a full set 
of capabilities.
In reality, the exact opposite is generally true. Devices marketed for a specific 
function are often capable of much more. Printers contain processors and may be 
capable of acting as file servers, for example. Furthermore, support for these devices 
is often outsourced, introducing a further source of potential risk in the form of 
external support technicians who enter the premises for monthly service visits. As a 
result, embedded devices can introduce as much risk, or more, to an organization as a 
traditional computing device since they lack security controls and administrators are 
generally unaware of the danger.
For attackers, embedded devices may become the path of least resistance. 
Embedded devices are always on and often poorly monitored. These devices store, 
transmit, and manage credentials and data, yet their default passwords are rarely 
changed. Some are initially configured to send data outside the network perimeter. Many 
can be remotely administered through web interfaces, making them viable points of 
attack. Furthermore, organizations often outsource on-site support of printers and other 
devices to an external supplier, who sends technicians to service the devices on a regular 
basis—introducing another potential source of risk that must be considered.
Security focus areas include printers and industrial control systems. In a recent 
example, researchers demonstrated they could replace printer firmware with fake 
updates capable of stealing information on documents sent to the printer, then 
forwarding this information to an external address. The vulnerabilities in industrial 
control systems were exposed by the widely publicized Stuxnet malware, which was used 
to sabotage systems with the apparent purpose of hampering Iran’s uranium enrichment 
capabilities.
The incorporation of computer-based control and automation technology into the 
existing electrical power infrastructure—resulting in the “smart grid”—is another source 
of potential vulnerabilities. The US government has warned of increasing threats to 
the grid, noting that many embedded systems lack adequate security controls and are 
susceptible to known techniques such as cross-site scripting attacks (US GAO 2012).
Embedded devices, including medical equipment, safety systems, and locks, 
increasingly include wireless capabilities, so exploitation doesn’t even require a physical 
network connection. Security researcher Jerome Radcliffe, a diabetic, remotely disabled 
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his own insulin pump live on stage at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas. Executing 
the attack required less than 60 seconds. In another celebrated example, researchers 
demonstrated a vulnerability in control systems at federal prisons that could allow an 
outsider to remotely take them over and perform functions that include opening  
cell doors.
We might also see logical attacks as precursors to physical attacks. On a macro scale, 
a nation state might attack another nation’s cyber infrastructure before staging a physical 
attack. This approach might also be applied at a more personal level. A burglar might 
remotely disable an Internet-connected alarm system before sneaking into a house, or 
perhaps even use the system’s video cameras to watch the owners and note when they 
leave the house unattended.
Smartphones
Smartphones are attracting almost as much malicious interest as desktop and laptop 
platforms. The adoption curve for smartphones is steep, with no end in sight. I expect the 
growth curve of smartphone malware to be at least as rapid.
Just as in legitimate software markets, malware authors are likely to maximize the 
value of their code by using tools that allow their software to run on multiple devices. They 
are increasingly targeting applications, a trend also seen on other platforms. A unique 
aspect of smartphone application attacks is the focus on application marketplaces, which 
present a convenient centralized location for disseminating malware. Attackers have 
purchased copies of applications, incorporated their malicious content into the otherwise 
legitimate software, and then redistributed their code under a new name or as a “free” 
version of the original. On one smartphone platform, autodialing malware was found in 
more than 20 applications. Variations of a Trojan were found in dozens of applications and 
are believed to have been downloaded by at least 30,000 users.
A further development is the use of smartphones as bridges to traditional networks, 
resulting in the potential for enterprise network attacks that originate from within mobile 
networks.
In the future, we could see greater exploitation of location-based services to deceive 
users. Because smartphones contain location sensors such as Global Positioning System 
(GPS) chips, knowledge of the phone’s location can be used to present targeted ads 
and useful information. For example, a user in a supermarket aisle might be presented 
with online coupons for products on nearby shelves. But this information could also be 
exploited to present fake coupons that are all the more convincing because they suggest 
that the sender knows the user’s preferences.
Attackers could also exploit other smartphone capabilities to take advantage of the 
fact that the devices are carried into confidential meetings and other highly sensitive 
situations. As security expert Dmitri Alperovitch recently observed (2012), “with remote 
control of a CEO’s mobile phone, an advanced persistent adversary could activate the 
microphone to record private negotiations.”
Current trends in the mobile platform space indicate attackers are most interested in 
stealing personal data. This trend is partly due to the increasing use of smartphones for 
financial and banking transactions, which provides new opportunities for identity thieves 
and other criminal groups. As a result, it is now important that smartphone hardware 
and software developers focus on protecting personal data. Software developers should 
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adopt the same discipline and commitment to following secure design principles as 
traditional platform developers. Today, more and more people are becoming app 
developers—creating software and posting it online for others to use. One has to question 
how much security testing and validation has been applied to these applications. As users 
move more of their everyday activities onto smartphones and other small devices, the 
consequences of poor or insecure designs will have greater impact on individuals and 
their employers.
Web Applications
Web applications, primarily comprising client browsers and server-based applications, 
continue to be heavily attacked. In our threat analysis model, we characterize this area as 
experiencing full exploitation activity and moving toward commoditization. There is also 
considerable research in this area, suggesting the number of attacks will continue to grow.
Attackers have adopted new techniques to hide their intentions and deceive users 
long enough to achieve their aims. As web browsers and search engines try to protect 
systems from malicious links, attackers are instead obfuscating their links in image search 
results, where they may not be detected.
Techniques for hiding messages within images have been used within the security 
realm since long before the invention of information technology. Now, this technique, 
known as steganography, is being used to hide malware and botnets on publicly used 
image hosting sites.
Search poisoning has also become a common method. Attackers using search 
poisoning tend to focus on events and topics of popular interest, optimizing their web 
pages to achieve high search engine rankings. After a search query, the victim clicks a link 
among the search results. They are redirected multiple times and eventually land on a 
page that is used as a vector to deliver malware.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I’ve outlined some of the real threat trends and described methods 
information security groups can use to analyze the threat landscape as it continues to 
evolve.
No doubt, new and more-sophisticated types of exploitation will continue to emerge, 
and we need to stay aware of them. As Mustaque Ahamad, director of Georgia Tech 
Information Security Center, noted recently (2011), “We continue to witness cyber attacks 
of unprecedented sophistication and reach, demonstrating that malicious actors have 
the ability to compromise and control millions of computers that belong to governments, 
private enterprises, and ordinary citizens.”
Yet, as we try to make sense of the deluge of news about attacks and vulnerabilities, 
it’s essential to retain a sense of perspective. Most threats do not take place using exotic, 
obscure methods. Instead, they take the path of least resistance, exploiting well-known 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, business can mitigate many of these threats by implementing 
basic, established security measures. To put it another way: when you hear hoof beats, 
think horses—not zebras.
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Social engineering will continue to be a key attack method because it takes 
advantage of user trust and is hard to prevent using technical controls. Therefore, as I 
discussed in Chapter 5, we need to continue to focus on educating users to become more 
security-aware. By doing so, we can reduce the risk to the enterprise.
Ultimately, while doing our best to prevent compromises and breaches, we must 
remember we cannot control the threat actors and their exploit attempts. For all 
organizations, some level of compromise is inevitable, making defense in depth as 
essential as ever. Losers ignore the trends. Winners survive by being able to predict, 
prevent, detect, and respond.
